Today, New Jersey became the third state in the country to legalize online gaming within its borders, as New Jersey Governor Chris Christie (R) signed into law a bill legalizing online gaming in the state.
Here is a video in which Jeff Ifrah, founding partner of Ifrah Law, discusses this exciting development.
Both houses of the state legislature had previously passed the bill by large margins and Gov. Christie had sent the bill back to the legislature requesting minor changes to the bill. The legislature made the changes requested by Gov. Christie, and on Tuesday the state General Assembly voted 68-5-1 to pass the bill with the Governor’s requested changes. The State Senate then voted to pass the bill by a margin of 35-1. Governor Christie signed the bill into law shortly thereafter.
The changes requested by the Governor included an enhanced level of funding for compulsive gambling treatment programs, a requirement that state employees and legislators disclose any representation past or present of entities seeking Internet gaming licenses, and an extension of a prohibition on any casino-related employment for state employees and legislators to include companies involved in Internet gaming.
New Jersey’s online gaming law would allow the state to participate in interstate gaming compacts with other states that have legalized online gaming within their borders, as long as this is consistent with federal law. Online gaming compacts would allow for the possibility of generating much larger player pools for the games as well as significant extra revenue for the state.
Under the law, casinos or their affiliates would be allowed to offer the same games that are currently offered on Atlantic City casino gaming floors. All players must be physically located in New Jersey, but do not need to be residents of New Jersey. There is no definitive word yet on when games will become operational, but it is quite possible that it could happen this year.
The law will help to stimulate the New Jersey economy and created needed jobs and revenue for the state.
“Internet gaming will provide a lifeline to New Jersey casinos by producing more jobs and additional revenue,” said bill sponsor New Jersey State Senator Raymond Lesniak (D). “At the same time, it will contribute to the state’s economic recovery and generate more revenue for state programs for seniors and the disabled.”
Under the law, all equipment used in Internet gaming is required to be located in Atlantic City. This will create a significant number of jobs in the region.
We are very happy to see New Jersey enact an online gaming law. This will be an enormous boost for the state as well as great news for gamers, who will soon be able to play online again.
A Nevada man now has a criminal record – simply because he placed a bet in a casino in Las Vegas and a casino employee didn’t ask him enough questions.
Robert Walker recently pleaded guilty in federal court to one misdemeanor count involving a record-keeping violation and was sentenced to one year of unsupervised probation. He was also ordered to pay a $250 fine and agreed to forfeit a $32,400 bet he made in March 2011.
Walker was a member of Acme Trading Group, a company whose members placed bets for several years at a number of casinos on Acme’s behalf. Acme is structured in a way that allows individuals to invest in the company, and bets are made on behalf of the company.
Messenger betting is a crime under Nevada law that occurs when wagers are placed at sports books by individuals on behalf of others. Thus far, Acme Trading Group has not been prosecuted for messenger betting, although Walker and others have clearly been subject to law enforcement scrutiny.
In November 2011, Walker was indicted on four felony counts under 31 U.S.C. 5313(a) for causing a domestic financial institution to fail to file an accurate currency transaction report. Walker faced a maximum of 20 years in prison and a $1 million fine if convicted of all charges.
The indictment alleged that on four occasions, Walker went to the Golden Nugget Casino Race & Sports Book and placed a bet of more than $10,000, and that when he was asked by the employee taking the bet if he was gambling on behalf of anyone else, he said that he was not.
Under federal law, all financial institutions, which include casinos, must file reports of any currency transactions over $10,000. The casino must also verify the name and the address of the individual placing the bet and the taxpayer identification information of the person on whose behalf the bet is being placed.
Walker’s attorneys contended in court filings that the burden is on the casinos, and not the individual bettor, to determine whether the individual is placing the bet on behalf of himself or a third party. Walker’s attorneys stated that Golden Nugget personnel never asked him if he was placing bets on behalf of someone else, and if they had asked him, he would have informed them that he was wagering on behalf of Acme. He had been instructed by his employer, he said, that if asked, he should reply to casino personnel that he was placing the bet on behalf of Acme.
Attorneys for Walker also stated in court papers that they hired an investigator who went to the Golden Nugget and engaged in at least seven transactions that required reporting under federal law. In none of those transactions did casino personnel ever ask the investigator if he was placing the wager for himself or on behalf of someone else.
This is a case that simply did not need to be prosecuted. Factually, there were very serious questions raised regarding the role that the casino played in trying to obtain the information necessary to file the reports and regarding the issue of who is responsible for making sure that information is reported.
Walker accepted a plea that would grant him a year of unsupervised probation; the indictment he was originally facing had a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison. Walker now has a criminal record as the result of very aggressive and unnecessary prosecution. Is this the type of case that the government’s limited prosecutorial resources should be focused on?
On February 5, 2013, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives filed a brief urging the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit to hold that U.S. legislators and their aides cannot be forced to testify about their legislative activities, even when their expected testimony might help exonerate a criminal defendant.
The case raises interesting questions about the balancing of constitutional imperatives – here, the separation of powers and a criminal defendant’s right to present a defense. Fraser Verrusio, a former House staffer, is hoping for a balance struck in favor of defendants’ rights.
In 2011, Verrusio was convicted of accepting an illegal gratuity in connection with his duties as then policy director of the House Transportation Committee. According to the prosecution, Verrusio accepted and failed to report an all-expenses-paid trip to New York City that included a ticket to the World Series and an outing to a strip club. The trip was funded by United Rentals, a construction-equipment company that had stepped up its lobbying efforts to get favorable amendments into the federal highway bill. United Rentals wooed senior staff member Verrusio, who reportedly advised the chair of the House Transportation Committee (as well as the committee) on legislative strategies and policy. Prosecutors alleged that when Verrusio accepted the $1,200 trip, he knew that United Rentals was compensating him for future assistance on the highway bill.
One key piece of evidence against Verrusio was an e-mail that United Rentals lobbyist James Hirni sent to Vivian Curry, legislative director for then-House Committee member John Boozman. In his e-mail, Hirni said, “I have spoken to [Verrusio] and he is good to go. I am resending him the language in the Senate bill, with changes which would represent the 100 percent victory for [United Rentals. Verrusio] asked us to give him the language plus what we would want in the perfect world.”
To address the possible inferences from that e-mail, Verrusio’s attorneys issued a trial subpoena to Curry. The defense expected her to testify that Verrusio had not inserted himself into the legislative process and had not pressured her. But Curry moved to quash the subpoena on grounds that her testimony was privileged under the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution. She argued that the testimony sought was protected because it concerned “information gathering for legislative purposes.”
Verrusio countered that the inability to call Curry would violate his rights to due process and to present a complete defense. During the hearing on Curry’s motion, the defense made a potentially critical error when it acknowledged the “high hurdle” imposed by the Speech or Debate Clause and then conceded that the clause “in fact did “appear to cover [the e-mail] communications.” The court held that Curry had properly invoked the privilege and could not be forced to testify.
After the jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts, Verrusio appealed. Among other things, he claims that the trial court erred when it prevented him from calling Curry as a witness. In his view, one of two results must follow. First, Verrusio contends that protections under the Speech or Debate Clause are not absolute but, in some cases, must give way to a defendant’s right to compulsory process. He argues that trial judges should balance a defendant’s need for otherwise-protected testimony against the potential burden on Congress. When the case involves an aide’s testimony regarding informal, passive information gathering from a third party, the potential burden is minimal to non-existent. In such cases, the next question to ask is whether the testimony sought is material. In cases like his — where the jury verdict is already of questionable validity — the “materiality” bar is lower. Thus, he argues, any evidence calling into question the government’s theory could have created reasonable doubt.
Verrusio contends in the alternative that, if the Speech or Debate Clause privilege is absolute, the indictment must be dismissed.
The prosecution replies that Verrusio waived his right to appeal the trial judge’s order to quash. Not only did the defense concede that Curry’s testimony was protected; it first introduced the “balancing test” argument on appeal. Therefore the appellate court may not consider it.
Speaking as friends of the court, the House’s Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group framed the issue as one upon which “the whole American fabric” rests – separation of powers. The decision is simply whether an individual’s right to evidence trumps American liberty in general – an impossible bar to meet. After summarizing the history of the Speech or Debate Clause, the House brief argues that the clause is absolute, regardless of whether the proceedings are civil or criminal. Moreover, the testimony Verrusio sought from Curry was unquestionably protected because it concerned “activities that were ‘an integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes by which Members participate in committee and House proceedings.’” According to the House brief, no court has held that the Speech or Debate Clause privilege is subject to a balancing test. And Verrusio’s reliance on cases recognizing some flexibility with respect to executive privilege is unavailing since executive privilege is not expressly mandated in the Constitution.
But the House brief glosses over the fact that executive privilege is rooted in separation of powers just like the speech or debate privilege. That leaves the question of why the separation of powers in executive-privilege cases need not be guarded so jealously.
Courts decline to address thorny constitutional questions if they can resolve a case on other grounds. It seems likely that the D.C. Circuit will home in on Verrusio’s alleged failure to preserve his argument and save the speech or debate issue for another day. Verrusio’s reply brief is due to be filed by March 13, 2013; the D.C. Circuit will likely issue its decision sometime mid-year.
New Jersey will likely learn within two weeks if it will be able to move forward with its plan to implement sports betting in the state’s casinos and racetracks.
U.S. District Judge Michael Shipp heard oral arguments in Trenton on February 14, 2013, on the constitutionality of the 1992 Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA) and will decide the initial fate of the bill passed last year by the state legislature to legalize sports betting in the state.
The implications of this ruling will be far-reaching, since a decision in favor of the state would remove the biggest hurdle for New Jersey and other states that wish to implement sports betting plans. A favorable ruling could bring live sports betting to New Jersey within a few months.
In December, the court heard oral arguments on the plaintiffs’ standing to bring the suit and found that they did have standing. Next, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced its intention to intervene and join the four major sports leagues and the NCAA as plaintiffs in the case. The DOJ filed a brief on February 1 defending the constitutionality of PASPA.
Paul Fishman, the U.S. attorney for the District of New Jersey, argued on behalf of the DOJ at the hearing and emphasized that PASPA was intended to stop the spread of state-sponsored gambling. Fishman’s arguments focused on the constitutional soundness of the statute, emphasizing that as long as there was a rational basis to pass the law, it was a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.
Ted Olson, the former United States Solicitor General who was arguing on behalf of the state, opened his arguments by making reference to the jobs and revenue that legalized sports betting would create for New Jersey. Olson also emphasized how state voters, the legislature, and the governor had all backed a law last year that would permit sports wagering but are prevented from implementing the law because of PASPA.
Fishman ended his initial arguments by discussing a 1991 memo written by the DOJ when PASPA was under consideration in Congress – a memo that the DOJ did not address in its brief on the constitutionality of PASPA. This memo noted that determinations of how to raise revenue are typically left to the states and since PASPA was seeking to regulate how states generate revenue, “it raises federalism issues.” Fishman tried to downplay the significance of the letter and argued that the “federalism issues” that the letter refers to were taken out of context.
The arguments covering the anti-commandeering principle, which prohibits the federal government from imposing duties on state legislators or executive officials to carry out a federal initiative, seemed to be of particular interest to Judge Shipp. Both sides argued at length about any costs or burden that New Jersey has been forced to take on in order to be in compliance with PASPA. Jeffrey Mishkin, representing the sports leagues, argued that for anti-commandeering issues to arise, the law must require some affirmative conduct from the state and that PASPA does not compel New Jersey to do anything. Olson also pointed out that there are costs and burdens imposed on New Jersey for complying with PASPA. Olson emphasized that the federal government should not be allowed to impose its will on the state, especially since Nevada has essentially been given a monopoly on single sports game betting under the statute.
The decision in this case will likely be appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. That court has heard prior appeals involving PASPA, but none of those cases addressed the issue of the constitutionality of the statute. The Supreme Court has never addressed PASPA.
It remains to be seen how Judge Shipp will rule in this case. State Sen. Raymond Lesniak, who has spearheaded New Jersey’s efforts to bring sports gambling to the state, has stated that sports betting could be live within 60 days if New Jersey receives a favorable ruling in the case. We support New Jersey’s efforts to legalize sports wagering in the state in the interests of helping its economy and citizens.
President Obama’s February 12 State of the Union address included the announcement of an executive order intended to permit greater sharing of information about possible threats to the nation’s cyber security among private companies and between private companies and the government.
“We know hackers steal people’s identities and infiltrate private e-mail. We know foreign countries and companies swipe our corporate secrets,” Obama said in the speech. “Now our enemies are also seeking the ability to sabotage our power grid, our financial institutions, and our air traffic control systems.”
The executive order permits businesses to enter voluntary information-sharing agreements in which they provide the government with information about possible cyber threats to the grid. In return, the government is permitted to provide private companies with classified technical information.
This is an admirable goal, and we support the president’s efforts to keep the nation safe in this way. However, it’s not the end of the story.
Last year, legislation was introduced in Congress to provide protection from liability to companies that share information about possible cyber attacks with each other and with the government. That legislation, however, did not pass, and some form of it will be introduced again this year. Sen. Tom Carper (D-Del.), the new chairman of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, has pledged to make a cyber security bill a high priority.
One important aspect of possible legislation of this type is whether it contains adequate safeguards to protect privacy. Last year, privacy advocates pointed out that in the name of protecting the nation against cyber threats, many versions of the bill contained provisions that allowed for “nearly unlimited monitoring of user data.”
If a final bill contains adequate privacy safeguards, we would support it, along with the executive order, as a means of keeping the nation safe.
We have previously reported in this space about the use of domain name seizures by American law enforcement – for example, here and here. Recent media reports show that domain name seizure has become the go-to tactic for law enforcement for other countries as well.
Canadian police made a series of arrests during an invitation-only Super Bowl party attended by 2300 people as part of Project Amethyst. A Royal Canadian Mounted Police spokesperson says this was connected with the arrest of 21 individuals related to a separate online credit betting operation in November. The more recent arrests were connected with an online sports betting operation that used the website located at www.platinumsb.com. In addition to arresting six individuals, officers also seized $2.5 million in cash as a result of the execution of nine search warrants in and around Toronto.
Police also seized the domain name associated with a Costa Rica-based website, which is registered with Washington State-based Enom, Inc. Police obtained a Canadian court order for that purpose, and then submitted a request under the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) between Canada and the United States. The domain name was then transferred to the control of Canadian law enforcement authorities who, in turn, redirected it to a new landing page. Visitors to the platinumsb.com website are now greeted by a notice stating that the web site has been “restrained by court order granted to the Attorney General of Ontario.”
Media reports indicate that the website was back online as www.platinumsb.tk within hours of the shutdown. The .tk top level domain belongs to Tokelau, a non-self-governing territory off the coast of New Zealand. The .tk version of the domain name was reportedly registered in 2004, suggesting that the group operating the sports book had set up contingency plans for a seizure of its .com website.
Whatever the merits of the Canadian prosecution against individuals affiliated with PlatinumSB, the seizure of the platinumsb.com domain name certainly shows that domain name seizure is by no means a tactic used only by U.S. law enforcement. As more and more businesses move largely or exclusively to the Internet, the global use of this law enforcement tactic is sure to grow.
Facebook is quickly expanding its real money gaming platform. Net Entertainments has signed a license agreement with Bonza Gaming, which is a joint venture between gaming publisher Plumbee and online gaming operator Sportingbet. Under the agreement Net Entertainment will offer a range of casino games to Bonza Gaming, which will create an app, Bonza Slots, that will be available on Facebook to users that want to participate in real money gaming.
Facebook is now the world’s largest social media outlet, with over a billion active users. Last summer, Facebook announced that it would expand its social gaming to real money gaming, beginning initially with users in the United Kingdom. Bonza Slots becomes the third real money gaming app on Facebook, joining Gamesys and 888 Holdings; all three companies have recently reached deals with Facebook to launch their real money gaming apps. With Facebook’s massive user base, it can accomplish what other online gaming sites could likely only achieve on a much smaller scale — the ability to reach a large and constantly growing base of players.
Facebook is no stranger to online gaming. For some time now, it has offered its users the option of playing online games for Facebook credits as an alternative to real money. In 2011, Facebook changed its advertising policies, allowing online gambling companies to advertise in jurisdictions where such services are permitted. In the past, Facebook has been extremely strict when it comes to advertising online gambling business on its website. Now, Facebook’s Advertising Guidelines web page has a specific online gambling clause under the Gambling and Lotteries subsection of the Ad Content section, which reads: “Ads that promote or facilitate online gambling, games of skill or lotteries, including online casino, sports books, bingo, or poker, are only allowed in specific countries with prior authorization from Facebook.”
It is not clear how much Facebook will charge real money gaming companies to operate on its platform. In general, Facebook charges other apps 30 percent of their revenue, and there is no indication that gaming will work any differently. After reviewing Facebook’s public filings, we still have some questions about this and we will report back as we find answers.
In any case, Facebook’s new online real gaming platform will immediately give it a strong position in the real money market in the United Kingdom and a great opportunity to monetize its very large user base. With legislative efforts for real money online gaming gaining momentum across the United States, Facebook could be well positioned to be a power in the U.S. market in the future if it chooses to do so.
New Jersey is poised to become the third state in the country to legalize online gaming. Today, Gov. Chris Christie (R) sent the state iGaming bill back to the legislature requesting some minor changes and indicated that he is prepared to move forward with the bill once those changes are made.
Gov. Christie’s statement said, “I have concluded that now is the time for our State to move forward, again leading the way for the nation, by becoming one of the first States to permit Internet gaming.” The statement goes on to say, “I authorize this step towards modernizing Atlantic City’s entertainment attractions cautiously, with carefully constructed limitations that will ensure the highest integrity and the most robust oversight.”
New Jersey’s online gaming bill allows for all casino games to be played online, not just poker.
On December 20, 2012, the New Jersey State Senate voted 33-3 to legalize online gaming in the state after the state General Assembly previously approved the bill by a vote of 48-25-3.
State legislators have indicated that they are prepared to make the changes suggested by the governor and could get a new bill back on his desk in a matter of weeks.
The sponsor of the bill, State Sen. Raymond Lesniak (D), called the governor’s decision “a huge win” and something that “can help keep Atlantic City from drowning in red ink.”
The changes requested by Gov. Christie today included an increase in the tax rate on revenues generated from online gaming, additional funding for problem gamblers, and tighter regulations on relationships between state employees and companies that hold an Internet gaming license. The bill also expires in 10 years, although there is nothing preventing the state from renewing the legislation in the future.
We are very happy to see New Jersey take a huge step toward bringing Internet gaming to the state and toward adding more jobs and revenue.
On Friday, February 1, 2013, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a brief in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey defending the constitutionality of the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 (PASPA), the hotly contested federal law that prohibits sports betting in most states. New Jersey is seeking to have the court find this law unconstitutional. A win for the state would have far-reaching ramifications by eliminating the primary hurdle that individual states have in implementing legal sports betting within their borders.
PASPA prohibits any state from offering sports betting unless that state had a sports betting scheme in place between 1976 and 1990. New Jersey had a one-year period to enact sports betting, but its legislature failed to act. Delaware, Oregon and Montana have limited sports betting schemes in place, and Nevada is the only state that is authorized to offer single-game sports betting under the law.
On January 22, DOJ announced that it planned to intervene in the lawsuit brought by the four major professional sports leagues and the NCAA challenging the New Jersey state law. DOJ could have brought a case when the law was initially passed, but chose not to.
The DOJ brief raises three main constitutional issues: the anti-commandeering principles of the Tenth Amendment, Congress’s power to regulate sports wagering under the Commerce Clause and the applicability of the uniformity and equal sovereignty principles under the Commerce Clause, and due process and equal protection clause issues under the Fifth Amendment.
DOJ argues in its brief that the anti-commandeering principle applies only when a federal statute requires specific, affirmative action by a state and that since PASPA does not require New Jersey to take any action but merely to refrain from starting a betting program, the principle is inapplicable.
New Jersey replies that the anti-commandeering principle does apply because a federal law is imposing constraints on the state. PASPA’s stated purpose is “to require States to govern according to Congress’ instructions.” The Supreme Court case that established the anti-commandeering principle, New York v. United States (1992), states that “the Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern according to Congress’ instructions.”
Additionally, under the Tenth Amendment, the power of the federal government is limited. Courts have typically viewed the ability to raise revenue, such as through gambling, as one of those rights reserved to the states. New Jersey has successfully regulated gambling for decades but has been prohibited from regulating sports betting simply because it did not have a betting scheme in place before enactment of PASPA over 20 years ago.
DOJ argues that PASPA is a valid exercise of federal power under the Commerce Clause because sports gambling has an effect on interstate commerce and PASPA is a rational method of achieving regulation of it. DOJ also does not give any credence to the argument that the law violates the principle of equal sovereignty.
New Jersey argues that the principle of equal sovereignty does apply under the Commerce Clause. The plain text of the Commerce Clause does not make clear that all states must be treated uniformly, but the state believes that the case law makes it applicable.
New Jersey argues that contrary cases cited by DOJ deal with regulations that fell unevenly on the states because of circumstances that were not spread through the country, largely based on geography. However, the rationale for allowing some states to authorize sports betting and not others was the pre-existing scheme in place before PASPA and nothing else. The grandfathering clause of PASPA has served to grant a monopoly to Nevada while discriminating against all other states. This federal government-sponsored monopoly denies to the states the equal sovereignty that they are guaranteed under the Constitution.
The DOJ brief states that the arguments that PASPA violates the due process and equal protection guarantees of the Fifth Amendment are inapplicable because they protect only “persons” and not states from actions of the federal government. New Jersey argues that the discrimination between the states that PASPA has produced, by essentially granting Nevada a monopoly on single games sports betting, rises to the level of “injurious character” as to violate due process. This is likely the weakest argument that the state is making, and the court will likely rule in favor of DOJ on this point.
When PASPA was being debated in Congress, DOJ sent a letter to then Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.), then the Judiciary Committee chairman, discussing the views of DOJ on PASPA. The letter noted that determinations of how to raise revenue are typically left to the states and since PASPA was seeking to regulate how states generate revenue, “it raises federalism issues.” DOJ chose not to address that letter in its brief.
New Jersey and the New Jersey Thoroughbred Horseman’s Association will have an opportunity to file a reply brief with the court by February 8. Oral arguments on the constitutionality of PASPA will be held on February 14.
The arguments made in the DOJ brief, for the most part, have already been made by counsel for the sports leagues. However, it remains to be seen if the court will give the arguments more weight because they were made by the U.S. government.
If the court accepts any of the arguments made by New Jersey that PASPA is unconstitutional, then New Jersey will prevail. It remains to be seen how the court will rule, but the constitutionality of PASPA will surely be tested and the consequences of this ruling will be very far-reaching. Whichever side loses the battle in the district court will likely appeal, meaning it may be some time before it is settled whether New Jersey can proceed with its plan to implement sports betting.
In a January 23, 2013, ruling, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit held that an Indiana law that prohibited most registered sex offenders from using social media websites was unconstitutional because it was “not narrowly tailored to protect the state’s interest.” The decision was restricted to the Indiana statute on sex offenders and did not extend its reasoning to another, related issue – whether courts can permissibly, as a condition of probation or supervised release, restrict white-collar criminals from using the Internet.
The fatal flaw of the Indiana law, the appeals court held, was that it was overbroad because it targeted substantial protected speech, rather than retaining a narrow focus on the specific evil of improper communication to minors.
The 7th Circuit noted that the Indiana statute affected First Amendment rights because it controlled expression via social media and limited the ability to receive information and ideas.
In recent cases of various sorts, including e-commerce cases, federal courts have proved all too willing to imposed Internet bans that trample on various constitutional rights. We focused on this problem in a National Law Journal article a couple of years ago that argued that courts go too far when they impose a broad ban on the use of the Internet against a defendant who had committed online fraud.
In the sex-offender case, Doe v. Marion County Prosecutor, the 7th Circuit acknowledged the strong state interest in protecting minors from harmful online communication, but explained that the ban must be narrowly tailored to target only the appropriate evil. All parties agreed that there is nothing inherently dangerous about using social media – except when a sex offender communicates with minors, which is only a “minuscule subset of the universe of social network activity.”
The same principle ought to be applied to restrictions on Internet use placed upon those who have been found guilty of fraud in e-commerce. Not all Internet usage should be treated as suspect.
Towards the end of its opinion, the court discussed Internet restrictions in the context of conditions of probation or supervised release. The court distinguished between a criminal statute, as in Indiana, that governs the protected speech of the general populace (including registered sex offenders) and the sentences imposed by district courts that may govern Internet usage.
The court said its opinion “should not be read to affect district courts’ latitude in fashioning terms of supervised release.” It elaborated that “Our penal system necessarily implicates various constitutional rights . . . a court could conceivably limit a defendant’s Internet access if full access posed too high a risk of recidivism.”
Somewhat ironically, the court noted that “The alternative to limited Internet access may be additional time in prison, which is surely more restrictive of speech than a limitation on electronics.” Although the 7th Circuit was not willing to expand its protection of Internet usage to the sentencing and probation context, we still think that its strong protection of Internet usage in the First Amendment context bodes well for future challenges in that context.