On June 7, 2013, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) as well as the four major professional sports leagues and the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) filed their briefs in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in a case with major implications for the future of sports betting in the United States.
Last February, U.S. District Judge Michael Shipp struck down New Jersey’s new sports betting law, finding it invalid as conflicting with federal law. The federal law at issue is the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 (PASPA), which prohibits any state from offering sports betting unless the state had a sports betting scheme in place between 1976 and 1990.
In December, the court held oral arguments on just the standing issue and later held that the leagues did have standing to bring the suit. The Department of Justice later intervened in the lawsuit to defend the constitutionality of PASPA.
New Jersey filed its opening brief in April and will have the opportunity to file a reply brief by June 14 to the briefs submitted by DOJ and the sports leagues. Oral arguments are scheduled for June 26. New Jersey is challenging both the constitutionality of PASPA and the leagues’ standing to bring the case.
Also in April, the attorneys general from Georgia, Kansas, Virginia and West Virginia filed an amicus brief with the Third Circuit in support of reversal of the district court’s ruling, on the basis that the ruling threatens the system of dual sovereignty.
A key to this case will likely be how the Third Circuit interprets the anti-commandeering principle recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in a number of cases. DOJ argues in its brief that PASPA does not offend the anti-commandeering principle and focuses on the fact that the Supreme Court has only applied the principle twice in invalidating a federal law.
DOJ argues that from those two decisions the Supreme Court has established “the basic touchstone of the anti-commandeering doctrine: it applies when a federal law requires a State to enact or implement a federal regulatory program.” In this case, PASPA is not demanding affirmative regulatory action; instead it prohibits New Jersey from sponsoring sports betting. The brief from the leagues points out that the Third Circuit has never held that a statute violates the Tenth Amendment.
The other key constitutional question that the Third Circuit is being asked to address is whether PASPA violates the equal sovereignty principle. New Jersey has argued that because PASPA discriminates among the states by allowing only a few states to offer sports betting, it violates the state’s right to equal sovereignty, which requires any discrimination among the states to be justified by “a showing that a statute’s geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.” DOJ argues that PASPA does not offend the equal sovereignty doctrine and has traditionally been applied only in the context of States’ admission to the Union, and “has never been understood to invalidate, or even subject to heightened scrutiny, all federal legislation that draws distinctions among particular States.”
Regardless of the decision reached by the Third Circuit, the losing party will have the option of seeking a rehearing en banc in the Third Circuit, or filing for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. However, both options are discretionary, leaving the possibility that the ruling from the Third Circuit will be final.
There have been prior challenges to PASPA in federal court, but none of those cases required the court to directly address the constitutionality of the statute, which the Third Circuit is being asked to do here.
The ruling from the Third Circuit in this case will have far-reaching implications. A decision in New Jersey’s favor removes the primary hurdle preventing states from offering sports betting within their borders. A decision that opines on the constitutional issues in the case could have a significant impact in the future on the federal government’s ability to regulate the states.
Two years ago, we anticipated a growing problem with jurors who disregard trial judges’ instructions concerning Internet use. In July 2011, we reported on the first known prosecution of a juror in Great Britain for Internet-related misconduct. Since then, a Florida judge sentenced a Sarasota County juror to three days in jail for criminal contempt. In that case, the juror contacted a civil defendant on Facebook during jury selection and then bragged about his subsequent dismissal after having been seated on the jury. One month later, a New Jersey court found a jury foreman guilty of criminal contempt. In that case, the juror was required to pay a $500 fine for conducting online research into possible penalties the defendant would face if convicted on drug charges.
Kansas has now followed suit. On May 20, 2013, a court in Topeka found James Reeder guilty of criminal contempt for posting online comments while serving as a juror in a murder trial. The trial involved Anceo Stovall, one of nine defendants charged with felony murder and robbery in connection with the shooting death of a Kansas attorney and the wounding of her companion. Stovall also faced charges for unrelated crimes, including burglary of a vehicle and aggravated robbery of a co-defendant. Throughout the month-long trial, the trial judge instructed jurors not to “seek out and read any media accounts” about the crime or the trial.
Reeder didn’t heed the instruction. Soon after the jury began deliberating, Reeder visited the Topeka Capital-Journal’s website and read an article about the case. On July 21, Reeder posted a comment to the site using the pseudonym “BePrepared.” In response to another commenter, Reeder wrote, “Trust me that’s all they got in their little world, as you, I have been there. Remember the pukes names they will do it for ever [sic].”
Three days later, the jury announced that it could not reach a verdict on nine counts related to the felony murder. On the unrelated charges, Stovall was found guilty of aggravated robbery and not guilty of burglary. He requested a new trial on the robbery charge. Among other things, Stovall alleged juror misconduct based on evidence that Reeder had reviewed and commented on trial-related news in violation of the judge’s orders. As a result, Stovall’s robbery conviction was overturned and his motion for new trial granted. Months later, Stovall entered a plea deal and was sentenced to almost 11 years in prison.
Reeder appeared in court last month for his contempt hearing, arguing that his online post had not caused any harm. In one sense, his argument had appeal. The jury failed to reach a verdict on nine charges, so the case was going to be retried regardless. Additional costs for retrying the robbery charge would have been marginal. On the other hand, it was at least possible that Reeder’s misconduct had prevented the jury from reaching a unanimous decision on every count.
The trial judge didn’t care either way. In her view, “[t]here is great harm that results when someone in Mr. Reeder’s position of great trust violates in this way.” Having found the juror guilty of indirect criminal contempt, the court ordered him to pay a $1,000 fine or spend three days in jail. No doubt, the trial judge intends to send a message: jurors like “BePrepared” should be prepared to follow her instructions on Internet use or deal with the consequences.
On May 28, 2013, federal prosecutors unsealed an indictment charging seven men with allegedly operating an organization known as “Liberty Reserve,” which prosecutors allege was established for the sole purpose of creating an illegal digital currency that could be used to launder money. This is a case that anyone involved in businesses that rely in any way on bitcoins will definitely want to watch.
Prosecutors say that Liberty Reserve was used to aid in identity theft, computer hacking, and other illegal activities. The indictment alleged that Liberty Reserve was responsible for laundering more than $6 billion over the last seven years through 55 million transactions. The company allegedly has about one million users across the globe, including 200,000 in the United States.
The indictment comes just a few months after the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), a branch of the United States Department of the Treasury, issued new guidelines stating that virtual currency exchanges should follow traditional money laundering rules. Virtual currencies, such as the well-known bitcoin, account for only a small percentage of global financial transactions, but their popularity is growing rapidly.
Like bitcoin, Liberty Reserve operated as a virtual currency exchange; however, there are some key differences between bitcoin exchanges and Liberty Reserve. Bitcoin transactions operate in a more transparent way than transactions on Liberty Reserve did. Bitcoin transactions are stored in a public ledger called a “block chain” to keep people from writing the equivalent of a bad check with bitcoins. It is that same public block chain that makes it possible to trace transactions years after they have occurred.
Earlier this month, federal authorities cracked down on Mt. Gox, the world’s largest bitcoin exchange. The basis of the crackdown on Mt. Gox was a failure to properly register as a money transmitter. There were no allegations by law enforcement that bitcoin currency itself violated state or federal law. Indeed, the Treasury Department regulations reflect that such currency is lawful, but subject to regulation.
This month’s actions by federal authorities against Mt. Gox and Liberty Reserve clearly show that law enforcement is monitoring virtual currency exchanges. Although there is no immediate reason to believe that a properly registered bitcoin exchange violates state or federal law, those companies operating virtual currency or bitcoin exchanges should be aware that law enforcement is following this trend and capable of quickly reacting to perceived violations of the law.
On May 31, the House Committee on Judiciary Over-Criminalization Task Force will begin a six-month investigation to determine whether the U.S. Code over-criminalizes relatively minor conduct. The bipartisan task force, composed of five Republicans and five Democrats, will conduct hearings and review thousands of federal criminal statutes for purposes of recommending consensus-based improvements to federal criminal law.
Legislators of all political stripes recognize the need for reform. Experts estimate that the U.S. Code contains 4,500 federal crimes and up to 300,000 regulations that provide for the imposition of criminal penalties. One-third of all federal criminal statutes were added to the U.S. Code within the last 30 years. This recent explosion in federal criminal law has added significant costs for prosecution, resolution, and incarceration. Sometimes Congress enacts new laws that overlap with existing state law, thus transferring enforcement costs from the states to the federal government.
Over-criminalization also burdens individuals. Indeed, the labyrinth of federal criminal statutes and regulations seriously undermines a basic tenet of criminal law — that people should have fair notice of what is against the law. Stories abound to show that the presumption can be as unrealistic as the real-world consequences are devastating:
• In 2003, Texas senior citizen George Norris was indicted in Miami for importing mislabeled orchids in violation of an international treaty as implemented by the Endangered Species Act. After pleading guilty to the charges, Norris was sentenced to 17 months in prison — part of which he served in solitary confinement — and two years of supervised release. He was also ordered to pay an assessment of $700. Although he had no prior record, the orchid-gardener-turned-felon cannot vote, own a gun, or keep alcohol in his home.
• In 2007, Lawrence Lewis was charged with discharging pollutants in violation of the Clean Water Act. Formerly the chief engineer at a military retirement home near D.C., Lewis made the ill-advised but well-intentioned decision to divert backed-up sewage into an outside storm drain to prevent flooding in an area where the military home’s most vulnerable residents lived. Lewis mistakenly believed that the storm drain emptied into a waste-treatment facility; instead, the drain emptied into a creek that feeds the Potomac River. Lewis decided the risks associated with fighting the charge were too great, so he pleaded guilty. He was sentenced to probation and ordered to pay a $2,500 fine.
• In 2011, 11-year old Skylar Capo rescued a baby woodpecker near Fredericksburg, Va. Two weeks later, an employee of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service traveled to the girl’s home to cite her for violation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, a misdemeanor punishable by up to six months in jail, a fine, or both. The federal agent confirmed that Skylar had already released the bird and canceled the citation. But the automated system processed the citation anyway, so Skylar received a notice requiring her to pay a $535 fine and threatening possible jail time. Although the Fish and Wildlife Service apologized for the error, the case illustrates the potential for abuse that exists due to over-criminalization.
No doubt, the task force will investigate ways to minimize such absurd results. It remains to be seen whether the investigation will produce meaningful change. On one hand, there is reason for hope: efforts to address over-criminalization have broad support among Republicans, Democrats, and a diverse coalition of groups including the Heritage Foundation, Cato Institute, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the American Bar Association.
On the other hand, history suggests that change will not come easy. The House Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security conducted a hearing on over-criminalization almost four years ago, but congressional efforts to address the problem never gained traction. For example, current Task Force member Jim Sensenbrenner (R-Wis.) is a sponsor of the Criminal Code Modernization and Simplification Act, which would reduce the federal criminal code by one-third and otherwise consolidate and streamline federal criminal law.
Sensenbrenner introduced versions of the bill in 2006, 2007, 2009, and 2011, but none was enacted. He reportedly intends to reintroduce the bill this year. If the task force and its supporters are able to raise awareness of how over-criminalization burdens society and individual liberties, legislators on both sides of the aisle may find the political capital they need to get something done.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in the landmark 1966 case of Miranda v. Arizona underlined the importance of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments and drew a line that law enforcement must not cross – all in the interest of protecting individuals’ constitutional rights. Unfortunately, however, the high court was not as clear regarding the level of protection required under the Fourth Amendment in its 2012 decision in United States v. Jones.
In Jones, the Court held that a Fourth Amendment “search” occurs, and a warrant is required, when a GPS tracking device is attached by law enforcement to a person’s vehicle and then used to track its movements. Remaining unclear from the opinion, however, was whether and when such searches could be ever be exempt from the warrant requirement. Further unclear was whether the ruling would apply to other technologies, such as smartphones and OnStar systems.
Because of these ambiguities, and magnified by developments in location technologies, Fourth Amendment and privacy rights are giving way to aggressive law enforcement – and courts are divided on the propriety of these tactics. The Obama Administration recently argued before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit that the Supreme Court has given the government broad exemptions to search warrant requirements (such as the “reasonable suspicion” and the “probable cause” exceptions) and that device tracking can fall under these exemptions.
Far more troubling, however, is a recent opinion by a federal magistrate in New York in which U.S. Magistrate Judge Gary Brown effectively eviscerated Fourth Amendment protections for device tracking. Brown ruled that a search warrant is not necessary for authorities to obtain real-time location information for a suspect’s cell phone. Brown held that “phone users who fail to turn off their cell phones do not exhibit an expectation of privacy.” The magistrate’s opinion would mean that we are all effectively giving our consent to search by virtue of using a ubiquitous (and near-essential) technology.
Brown’s opinion contrasts starkly with Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s concurring opinion in Jones, in which she noted:
People disclose the phone numbers that they dial or text to their cellular providers, the URLs that they visit and the e-mail addresses with which they correspond to their Internet service providers, and the books, groceries and medications they purchase to online retailers . . . I would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.
The contrasting statements among the courts have reinforced the need for Congress to step in and circumscribe law enforcement tracking tactics. Currently before the House are both H.R. 983, the Online Communications and Geolocation Protection Act and H.R. 1312, the Geolocation Privacy and Surveillance Act. Both bills are aimed at providing a legal framework for when and how location tracking devices can be used, and when and how data location records may be obtained. Both bills were introduced during the last Congress and reintroduced during this term. With bipartisan support, hopefully they will get traction. In the meantime, you may want to keep your cell phone powered off.
A Houston couple is giving an estimated $4 billion in the next few years to try to solve some of the nation’s social problems by the application of careful thought and statistical analysis – and the criminal justice system is one of their targets.
John and Laura Arnold have that much to give away because John, still only 39 years old, made a vast fortune as a hedge-fund trader.
As a current Wall Street Journal article entitled “The New Science of Giving” explains, the Arnolds’ approach is quite different from the plan that most mega-donors select. Rather than pick existing institutions like cancer centers, women’s shelters, or anti-hunger programs to give money to, the Arnolds want to fund new, alternative approaches to solving problems. Chief among those new approaches is the use of data analysis and science.
Among their targets is the nation’s criminal justice system, where the Arnolds want to understand not the broad constitutional principles but their application in the states on a daily basis and to try to figure out how the system can be improved. They have hired Anne Milgram, a former New Jersey attorney general, to spearhead this effort.
One aspect of the system that the Arnolds are interested in right now is how judges make their decisions to keep nonviolent pretrial defendants behind bars. There just isn’t enough science behind those decisions, the Arnolds believe, and they are spending millions of dollars to create a risk-assessment tool that judges can use to choose whether to lock people up pending trial or to return them to their families. The assessment tool benefited from data from 1.5 million cases – the sort of “big data” that has hardly ever been used in the criminal justice system to date.
We are quite interested in how this project works out and whether a data-driven approach turns out to help prosecutors and defendants. If some quantifiable benefit can be shown, it won’t be just nonviolent crime that will be affected. We’d then expect to see some application of these principles in white-collar crime sentencing and even in civil cases. It’s not clear where the dollars will come from, beyond the Arnolds’ massive infusion of cash, but there’s a significant chance that real change in the justice system may occur in the next decade or so.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit recently ruled on an issue lying at the intersection of fraud conspiracies and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: the government’s separate burden of proof against each co-defendant when multiple plea bargains are entered. Specifically, the 11th Circuit was addressing whether the government presented sufficient evidence to show, in a credit card fraud case, that the defendant’s criminal activity affected at least 250 victims. Finding that the government had come dramatically short of meeting its evidentiary burden, the appeals court opened its opinion with a flare of witty admonition: “Sometimes a number is just a number, but when the number at issue triggers an enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines, that number matters.”
The facts of this case are as interesting as the court’s tone. The defendant was Gary Washington, who pleaded guilty to four offenses related to his role in a credit card fraud conspiracy that affected more than 6,000 individual cardholders. At first blush, it stands to reason that his sentence was calculated using a level-6 enhancement, which is reserved for crimes affecting 250 or more victims. However, there was a critical issue that the government and the district court failed to appreciate: Washington didn’t enter the conspiracy until four months after its inception, so the full victim count couldn’t be summarily applied to him.
Remarkably, before the sentencing hearing, Washington conceded that “in all probability there were more than 250 victims.” However, his sticking point was that he wanted the government to submit “hard evidence” supporting a level-6 enhancement in place of its “verbal assurances.” The government essentially ignored his requests and proceeded to the hearing without submitting additional evidence. Washington objected again at the sentencing hearing, but the district court overruled his objection and applied the level-6 enhancement, noting that the figure had been applied to the other defendants’ sentences.
On appeal, the 11th Circuit found the government’s representations insufficient and stated that “evidence presented at the trial or sentencing hearing of another may not – without more – be used to fashion a defendant’s sentence if the defendant objects.” The appeals court pointed out that it was especially inappropriate to use the other co-defendants’ sentences as a guide, because Washington joined the conspiracy well after it began. Following this reasoning, the appeals court set aside Washington’s sentence and remanded the case to the lower court for resentencing. The 11th Circuit declined the government’s request to present additional evidence on remand, because nothing had prevented it from presenting sufficient evidence at the original sentencing hearing.
This case is another example of federal prosecutors and trial courts losing sight of our system’s fundamental canon: a defendant is innocent until proven guilty. In some instances, the procedural safeguards that protect this system may seem inefficient and unnecessary. However, the alternative would beckon trial courts down the slippery slope of replacing actual evidence with assumptions. Fortunately, the appeals courts are present as a way of reining them in.
Former Enron executive Jeffrey Skilling reportedly has negotiated a deal with federal prosecutors that is likely to result in a significant reduction of the prison sentence he will serve for his role in the collapse of Enron. Under the new agreement, Skilling faces between 14 and 17.5 years in prison — a 27 to 42 percent reduction relative to his previous sentence of 24 years. Apparently, Skilling’s aggressive defense wore prosecutors down in such a way that they are now willing to give up almost half of Skilling’s prison sentence to resolve the case once and for all.
In May 2006, Skilling was convicted on one count of conspiracy, 12 counts of securities fraud, five counts of making false statements to auditors, and one count of insider trading. As a result, he was sentenced to roughly 24 years in prison and ordered to pay $45 million in restitution.
Skilling appealed the convictions and sentence with some success. First, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit vacated his sentence on the grounds that the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines had been misapplied. Then, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the trial record did not support his conviction for conspiracy to commit “honest services” wire fraud. On remand, the 5th Circuit found the “honest services” error to be harmless and upheld the conviction so all that remained was for Skilling to be resentenced.
Skilling’s attorneys were preparing to request a second trial based on newly discovered evidence, but the prosecutors evidently decided that the fight was not worth it. According to prosecutors, the government has invested extraordinary resources in bringing Skilling to justice, and a second round would impose even greater costs, delay resolution, and delay restitution payments to Skilling’s victims.
The parties’ agreement will facilitate closure by stipulating that a sentence in the range of 14 to 17.5 years is reasonable. Both parties have agreed not to contest a sentence within that range and have reserved their right to contest a sentence outside that range.
U.S. District Judge Sim Lake, the sentencing judge, is likely to agree with the parties, as a sentence outside the agreed-upon range would burden the parties with costs they would rather avoid.
Skilling is scheduled to be resentenced in the Southern District of Texas on June 21.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit is currently considering a sentencing issue of great significance in cases in which a number of individuals work together to bring about a financial fraud. The question posed is the extent to which a defendant can and/or should be punished based on the profits made through the fraud when the defendant did not receive as much money from the fraud as his co-conspirators.
In Kluger v. United States, the appeals court must determine whether former attorney Matthew Kluger’s sentence was unduly harsh. Kluger was one of three men who pleaded guilty to insider trading last year in federal district court in Newark, New Jersey. In his plea, Kluger, who is 51, admitted that he stole data on about 30 transactions during 17 years at law firms that included Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom and Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati. The companies involved include Sun Microsystems, 3Com Corp., and Acxiom Corp. Kluger gave that information to his co-defendant, Kenneth Robinson, who in turn gave them to trader Garrett Bauer, who traded on the information and then sold at a great profit when the deals went public. Following the scheme, Bauer then distributed the money to his partners. Over the last four years of this arrangement, according to prosecutors, Bauer made about $32 million in illicit profits, while Robinson made more than $875,000. Kluger claims to have made more than $500,000.
The sentences that were meted out to Kluger and Bauer did not track this huge disparity in the benefit that each received from their illegal activities. Bauer was sentenced to nine years imprisonment. Kluger received a sentence of 12 years – the longest prison sentence ever given for insider trading, eclipsing the 11-year sentence received by Galleon Group co-founder Raj Rajaratnam. In sentencing Kluger, Judge Katherine Hayden said that she wanted to send a strong message about the “radiating effect of the loss of confidence in the market” caused by insider trading. Judge Hayden also emphasized Kluger’s abuse of trust given his position as a lawyer. Robinson, who cooperated with authorities and secretly recorded the other men for the FBI, received a sentence of only 27 months.
The notion that a defendant may be sentenced based on the aggregated gains of his co-conspirators is nothing new. Section 1B.1.3(1)(a)(1)(B) of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines expressly provides that, “in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity,” relevant conduct (which sets the amount to be used to calculate upward adjustments in the loss table of Section 2B1.1) includes “all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity . . .” But the acceptance of this approach may be strained by cases of insider trading and other white-collar crimes that increasingly involve astronomical amounts of money, and therefore expose all participants to draconian criminal sentences.
In appealing Kluger’s sentence, his attorneys stressed that the district court appeared not to have considered the disparity in the amount of money that Kluger actually received as a result of the insider trading compared with at least one of his co-conspirators. This argument echoes some of the reasoning of Judge Jed Rakoff in his sentencing of Rajat Gupta, who likewise received far less benefit from insider trading than his co-conspirator, Rajaratnam. The issue raises an interesting question: Should a defendant’s sentence be commensurate only with his or her own personal gain? Or is the measure of the proper severity of a sentence the total gain obtained by all of the participants – an approach that appears to be more in step with the concept of “relevant conduct” that plays an important role in calculating advisory ranges under the Sentencing Guidelines?
The Third Circuit’s determination on this issue may signal the direction that the courts take on this issue, or may be just the first ruling in what becomes a split among the circuits. The resolution of this issue will be particularly important in cases in which Section 2B1.1 (the loss value table) plays a critical role in determining Guidelines sentences.
April 30 was an historic day for online poker players in the United States. Just a bit more than two years after the indictment and civil cases that were termed “Black Friday” shut down the industry, Ultimate Poker became the first live real-money online poker site in the United States after Black Friday.
Nevada became the first state to legalize online poker in June 2011, and the regulations governing online gaming were issued in December 2011. Nevada gaming authorities granted Ultimate Poker a license in October and last week signed off last week on Ultimate Poker’s technology, which allowed them to launch.
Ultimate Gaming, a majority-owned subsidiary of Station Casinos, LLC, is operating UltimatePoker.com. Station Casinos owns sixteen casinos in Las Vegas. Ultimate Poker is the exclusive online gaming partner of the Ultimate Fighting Championship.
Right now, Ultimate Poker is only available to people who are over the age of 21 and are located in Nevada, though you do not have to be a Nevada resident to participate. Players can register and deposit money into their accounts from anywhere in the world, but can only play when they are physically in Nevada. Players can also make deposits and withdrawals at any of Station Casinos’ locations in Las Vegas.
To verify location, Ultimate Poker will triangulate a customers’ cell phone signal, though some cell phone carriers are not participating in the plan yet. Some players reported difficulty when they tried to play on Ultimate Poker on the first day, including issues with the geo-location services and players being unaware that their cell phone carrier was not participating.
Nevada recently passed a bill that would authorize the state to enter into interstate gaming compacts with other states, a reality that became possible after the U.S. Department of Justice released an opinion in December 2011 stating that the Wire Act applied only to sports betting. Liquidity could become an issue for a state with a relatively small population such as Nevada, so interstate compacts could become vital to the long term success of the state’s online gaming industry.
Online gaming is legal in both New Jersey and Delaware, though those states have yet to go live. Nearly a dozen other states have at least considered some form of online gaming legislation in the past year.
We are very happy to see online poker back online again. Some hurdles remain for companies to assure that their products operate smoothly and efficiently, but it is a good day for the industry and players that real money poker is back online.