The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit is set to become the first federal appellate court to answer the question left open by the Supreme Court in United States v. Jones. Last year, the Court held in Jones that a Fourth Amendment “search” occurs, and a warrant is required, when a GPS tracking device is attached by law enforcement to a person’s vehicle and then used to track its movements. The Court did not consider when, if ever, that type of search would be exempt from the Constitution’s warrant requirement.
Last month, the 3rd Circuit heard oral arguments on that question. It is expected to issue its decision later this year.The appeal relates to the prosecution of Harry, Michael, and Mark Katzin — three brothers charged with the burglary of a Rite Aid pharmacy in Pennsylvania. In 2009, authorities began investigating a rash of pharmacy burglaries in the Northeast. Most of the crimes targeted Rite Aid stores and appeared related because each occurred after someone had cut the wires to the pharmacy’s alarm system. Eventually, authorities identified Harry Katzin as a person of interest. He had been implicated in suspicious activities involving other Rite Aid pharmacies and was known to keep electrician’s tools, gloves and ski masks in his van.
Initially, agents physically tracked Katzin’s movements. Then they decided more comprehensive surveillance was needed, so they attached a GPS tracking device to Katzin’s bumper and waited. Two or three days later, the tracking device showed that the van had stopped at a Rite Aid store in Hamburg, Pa. After the van left, one agent drove to the store to confirm it had been burglarized while state troopers followed the van onto the highway. When the burglary was confirmed, troopers stopped the van and arrested the Katzins. Only then did authorities obtain a search warrant, which led to their discovery of merchandise from the Rite Aid store, parts of the pharmacy’s alarm system, and Schedule II drugs.
In April 2011, the brothers were charged with pharmacy burglary and possession of Schedule II drugs with intent to distribute. They filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence found in the van. At that time, neither the 3rd Circuit nor the Supreme Court had decided whether the attachment and use of an external GPS tracking device constitutes a Fourth Amendment search. In early 2012, the Jones Court made clear that it does. Applying Jones, the trial judge granted the Katzins’ motion, and the government appealed.
On appeal, the government argues that the search in question, i.e., the attachment and use of the GPS device, falls within one of two exceptions to the warrant requirement. Under the “reasonable suspicion” exception, a warrantless search may be conducted under limited circumstances if the minimal intrusion on the individual’s privacy is outweighed by a legitimate government interest. In this case, the government contends, the “trespass” to Katzin’s van was minimal because it involved the placement of a magnetic GPS device on the bumper. Subsequent monitoring of the device was minimally intrusive because it revealed only the location of the van — information that could be obtained by physical surveillance. In the government’s view, these minimal intrusions were outweighed by the government’s interests in investigating crime.
The government also argues that the search falls within the “probable cause” exception. Under that exception, officers may conduct a warrantless search of an automobile if there is probable cause to believe it contains contraband or if exigent circumstances make a warrant application impractical. The government claims that no warrant was required in this case because officers had probable cause to believe that Katzin would use his van to burglarize another Rite Aid pharmacy.
The Katzin brothers counter that neither exception applies. First, the “reasonable suspicion” exception does not apply because the officers installed the device without a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot at the time of installation. Instead, the officers proceeded on a hunch that turned out to be right. The Constitution requires more than that.
The “probable cause” exception does not apply because, when the officers installed the device, they had no reason to believe there was contraband in the van or that the van was readily mobile, which might have made a warrant application impractical. As the Katzins point out, the officers attached the device in the dead of night on a deserted street. If the officers had evidence to support probable cause under those circumstances, they should have applied for a warrant.
Our sense is that the trial court will be upheld. The Fourth Amendment’s baseline requirement is that searches be conducted pursuant to a valid warrant supported by probable cause. These facts do not appear to support an exception. As the trial judge noted, the government argues for application of the “reasonable suspicion” exception based on its general interest in efficient law enforcement. The government did not prove that the special needs of this case required the warrantless intrusion visited on the defendants.
Likewise, the government argues for application of the “probable cause” argument based on the officers’ general suspicion that Katzin would use his van to commit a crime in the coming days, weeks, or months. The government did not prove that the officers had probable cause to believe that a crime was in progress when the device was attached. If courts do not hold the line on these exceptions, the Fourth Amendment will be eviscerated.
The vast increase in the use of wireless data networks has led to new legal issues regarding network users’ right to privacy. A recent opinion issued by the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon indicates that, under some circumstances, individuals on an unsecured wireless network have a reasonable expectation of privacy entitling them to Fourth Amendment protection. As a result, police officers must obtain a warrant prior to accessing files on that network.
In United States v. Ahrndt, defendant John Henry Ahrndt moved to suppress evidence that a police officer obtained by accessing Ahrndt’s wireless home network and opening files without a search warrant.
In February 2007, one of Ahrndt’s neighbors connected to Ahrndt’s unsecured wireless internet network. When she opened her iTunes program, she was able to see “shared” files from Ahrndt’s iTunes and LimeWire accounts, and saw a number of titles indicative of child pornography.
The neighbor did not open any of the files, but called the police to report what she saw. A deputy came to her house and she showed him the file names as she had seen them. The deputy asked her to open one of the files. When she did, it opened an image of child pornography.
The deputy questioned the neighbor about whom the unsecured wireless network might belong to. She indicated that the network had been available since she moved into the building, and at the time Ahrndt’s home was the only other one that was occupied. The police ran the license plate of a car parked outside of the home and identified it as belonging to Ahrndt, a convicted sex offender.
Using a general description of what the neighbor and deputy recalled seeing in the list of file names, the police applied for and received a search warrant to access the wireless network again in order to get an IP address. The police then served a summons on the Internet provider. The provider disclosed that Ahrndt was the subscriber in question.
Using that information, the police obtained a search warrant for Ahrndt’s home. They ran a forensic search of his computer and identified images of child pornography in various folders. The forensic report did not mention either iTunes or LimeWire.
In considering the motion to suppress the evidence obtained through the initial warrantless search, the court concluded that it would have been appropriate for the deputy to view the titles of the files without a warrant, since a private party (the neighbor) had already viewed those files and told the police about them. However, the court concluded that it was a violation of Ahrndt’s Fourth Amendment rights for the police to instruct the neighbor to open the file, which she had not previously done. The opened image was no longer within the purview of private search, but a government search.
The court also found that Ahrndt’s privacy expectations were not eliminated by accessing an unsecured wireless network. There was no evidence that Ahrndt had intentionally enabled sharing for those files; rather, the default setting of the LimeWire program enabled sharing. It was Ahrndt’s reasonable belief that those files were contained only on his hard drive, and not shared on a public network. The court said that “[i]n short, the government does not dispute a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the files on his home personal computer.”
The court concluded that, lacking specific file names and a description of images, a magistrate would not have found probable cause to issue a search warrant. The only evidence that the police viewed lawfully was the file names, which the neighbor and deputy could not remember with specificity. Since the “partial recollections and characterizations” were too general to support a warrant, all related evidence from the unlawful search must be suppressed.
The court came to the right conclusion on this one. Our reliance on the Internet has become such that what is on our computers is as personal and private as the inside of our homes. The government is no more entitled to search our computer without probable cause than to search our homes. This case does not represent a free pass to intentionally share information on wireless networks and then assert Fourth Amendment rights when the government comes knocking. Rather, it is only that information to which an user has a reasonable expectation of privacy—such as files that he is not aware are accessible to others—that is protected against the government’s unlawful search and seizure.
It’s easy to see how this has implications for potential white-collar cases: the government might try to use financial information unintentionally made available to a neighbor through an unsecured network as a basis to initiate a financial fraud investigation. We hope that the courts will rely on this case and suppress any evidence obtained as a result of this type of unlawful search.
We have previously reported in this space about the use of domain name seizures by American law enforcement – for example, here and here. Recent media reports show that domain name seizure has become the go-to tactic for law enforcement for other countries as well.
Canadian police made a series of arrests during an invitation-only Super Bowl party attended by 2300 people as part of Project Amethyst. A Royal Canadian Mounted Police spokesperson says this was connected with the arrest of 21 individuals related to a separate online credit betting operation in November. The more recent arrests were connected with an online sports betting operation that used the website located at www.platinumsb.com. In addition to arresting six individuals, officers also seized $2.5 million in cash as a result of the execution of nine search warrants in and around Toronto.
Police also seized the domain name associated with a Costa Rica-based website, which is registered with Washington State-based Enom, Inc. Police obtained a Canadian court order for that purpose, and then submitted a request under the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) between Canada and the United States. The domain name was then transferred to the control of Canadian law enforcement authorities who, in turn, redirected it to a new landing page. Visitors to the platinumsb.com website are now greeted by a notice stating that the web site has been “restrained by court order granted to the Attorney General of Ontario.”
Media reports indicate that the website was back online as www.platinumsb.tk within hours of the shutdown. The .tk top level domain belongs to Tokelau, a non-self-governing territory off the coast of New Zealand. The .tk version of the domain name was reportedly registered in 2004, suggesting that the group operating the sports book had set up contingency plans for a seizure of its .com website.
Whatever the merits of the Canadian prosecution against individuals affiliated with PlatinumSB, the seizure of the platinumsb.com domain name certainly shows that domain name seizure is by no means a tactic used only by U.S. law enforcement. As more and more businesses move largely or exclusively to the Internet, the global use of this law enforcement tactic is sure to grow.
Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-Calif), a senior member of the House Judiciary Committee, has indicated that she is drafting legislation that would seek to increase judicial oversight over prosecutors’ efforts to act against Internet domain names accused of copyright infringement. While the value of such legislation will depend on the details of the bill, the notion of creating greater control over prosecutorial seizure of domain names is laudable.
Lofgren is one of a small number of legislators who voted against the PRO-IP Act of 2008, which authorized the government to shut down websites accused of online piracy or copyright violations by seizing their domain names. Under the enforcement operation that followed passage of that Act – dubbed “Operation In Our Sites” – the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has seized 1,630 domain names, of which 684 have been forfeited to the government. The increasing use of domain name seizures in this area tracks similar use of this tool in other areas of law enforcement such as internet gaming and online pharmaceutical sales.
Specifics about the contemplated legislation have not been disclosed, though Lofgren has been quoted as noting that there are “reasonable arguments” that the way in which the government has seized domain names under the PRO-IP Act violates the Constitution. Lofgren’s bill will apparently propose that the government must provide notice and an opportunity to be heard before domain names are seized or redirected.
The addition of a procedural requirement for notice and hearing prior to domain name seizure would clearly be a favorable development. There have been cases in which the government has seized a domain name and later permitted it to resume operations, under agreed-upon restrictions, pursuant to an arrangement with the affected business. To the extent that businesses may negotiate such arrangements with the government, those arrangements could be reached without the potentially devastating interruption of a seizure. By giving counsel for the affected business the opportunity to be heard, such a requirement may also chill the overuse of domain name seizure by government as a means of gaining unfair leverage in cases involving Internet-based businesses.
The devil, of course, is in the details. Lofgren has reportedly sought input from the online social media community on this bill – particularly from Reddit. Hopefully, she will also seek input from those members of the legal community who have been involved in litigation over domain name seizures as well in order to ensure that the bill presented for consideration is as effective as possible in balancing the interests of all affected parties.
Yet another shoe has dropped in the long-running investigation and the series of prosecutions arising from allegations of insider trading in the stocks of Goldman Sachs and other companies. In May 2011, Raj Rajaratnam was convicted of insider trading and ultimately sentenced to 11 years in prison. On June 15, 2012, Rajat Gupta, a former director at Goldman Sachs, was convicted in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York on four of six counts of an indictment that charged him with a conspiracy that included feeding inside tips to Rajaratnam in September and October 2008 about developments at Goldman Sachs.
As with the trial of Rajaratnam, the key pieces of evidence against Gupta appear to have been wiretapped conversations. The four charges on which Gupta was convicted all related to trades in support of which the government presented recorded conversations as evidence (though the government played only three recordings in the Gupta trial). The jury acquitted Gupta of two charges arising from other trades for which the government presented no such evidence. The jury clearly was influenced by hearing Rajaratnam on the recordings referring to his source on the Goldman Sachs board – powerful evidence that gave increased persuasive power to the government’s reliance on phone records showing substantial contacts between the two men.
Rajaratnam has appealed his conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and one significant issue he has raised is whether the government improperly sought authority to wiretap the conversations that were the cornerstone of his conviction. That ruling will be very significant, both because a decision in Rajaratnam’s favor is likely to result in a reversal of Gupta’s conviction as well, and because the Second Circuit’s ruling may have a major impact on the future ability of prosecutors to continue to use wiretaps against white-collar targets.
While Gupta is likely to receive a prison sentence for his conviction, it seems likely that he will receive a lower sentence that Rajaratnam, who engaged in the trades in question and reaped the benefits of those trades – estimated at trial to have generated $16 million in gains or in avoided losses from Rajaratnam’s fund. While prosecutors may seek a higher sentence based on acquitted conduct, Gupta’s advisory range calculated under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines may be as much as eight years in prison. There is also a significant question whether Judge Jed Rakoff, who has expressed frustration with what he calls “the guidelines’ fetish with abstract arithmetic,” will sentence Gupta to a shorter term than the one calculated under the Guidelines.
When you hear of FBI agents descending upon a place, you might think of a hostage situation, a drug raid, or the penetration of a terrorist cell. But you probably wouldn’t assume that those armed agents were working with the U.S. Department of Education on a raid on a Florida for-profit college.
FBI agents raided campuses of FastTrain College in May 2012 in order to obtain data (documents and a computer or two) in furtherance of a joint investigation of the FBI and DOE of allegedly deceptive practices. One might wonder why the drama was necessary: Couldn’t the government just subpoena the materials or go in with a little less gusto? Yes, but the drama may have been a part of the plan.
While on campus, the agents questioned students about their Pell grants, used for tuition and expenses. Not surprisingly, all this activity caused a good bit of chaos and stirred up concern among students. One student was quoted as saying he was glad he was on campus at the time of the raid, “because they could’ve took money from me, a lot of money from me, and I’d have been screwed.” Another student relayed concerns over whether FastTrain was going to continue to operate, and what would happen to his credits. The students’ statements demonstrate a real concern over the credibility and viability of the institution – a concern incited by the FBI’s dramatic entry.
The drama also had major impact online, where several reports seem to have already decided the guilt of the college, inaccurately stating that the investigation found “deceptive and otherwise questionable sales and marketing practices.” This inaccurate quote, which was picked up and disseminated by the Huffington Post, goes to show how careless journalism can set the tone of a story. Here’s what appears to have happened:
• One report noted that “[t]here was a major undercover investigation by the General Accounting Office in 2010 of for-profit trade schools, which receive billions in federal loans and grants. The investigation uncovered ‘deceptive and otherwise questionable sales and marketing practices’ according to a government inquiry.”
• A later report peeled off the second sentence, stating, “Our news partner Channel 4 reports the investigation uncovered ‘deceptive and otherwise questionable sales and marketing practices,’ according to a government inquiry.”
• That quote itself was then picked up by Huffington Post contributor David Halperin, who stated “One report says the investigation found ‘deceptive and otherwise questionable sales and marketing practices.’”
These latter two stories missed the point that the identified deceptive practices were a part of the earlier 2010 GAO investigation and had nothing to do with the still-pending investigation of FastTrain. It appears that some writers are more than eager to jump to conclusions about the alleged greed of for-profit educators.
The DOE and the FBI have raided for-profit schools several times over the past several years – including at ITT and Corinthian College campuses. One source says that years into the ITT investigation, it finally concluded with no finding of wrongdoing. (Tell that to the students who fled from the school’s programs after the FBI raid.)
So why do the DOE and FBI keep up these shows of force at for-profit college campuses? Some of us skeptics may posit that they already have figured out for themselves that these institutions are bad, so they are making life difficult for the schools in order to give the industry a bad name in students’ eyes.
The FBI and DOE should follow the normal steps of investigation. Playing out drama and rigging public opinion before facts are gathered seems as incendiary as crying “fire” in a crowded theater or inspiring a bank run.
Q: Why did you start the blog?
A: We wanted to share our analysis of breaking news in the white collar crime area. The blog is an opportunity to demonstrate to current and prospective clients our understanding and expertise on compelling issues in white collar representation.
Q: What is the purpose of the blog?
A: We want to generate news rather than just commenting on existing stories. We want to be a place where news is first reported rather than only analyzing cases in a public forum. We do this by being the first to identify and discuss an up and coming legal issue. For example, we were among the first to identify a circuit split in the GPS case, and noted that the issue was likely to be heard by the Supreme Court. (It was later granted cert). Similarly, we identified a circuit split between the DC Circuit and the Ninth Circuit regarding legislative privilege. Because we were among the first to discuss this, news outlets called us as experts when the story gained widespread interest.
Q: How long did it take before the media began relying on Crime in the Suites as a new source?
A: It took about a year and a half of building up credibility. Generally, the stories that the media picks up on are ones that aren’t really out there yet. For example, when there was discussion of creating a whistleblower provision in the FCPA, we took a strong stand on that on why that didn’t make sense, and it was picked up by the Wall Street Journal.
Q: What makes readers come to Crime in the Suites?
A: We have the experience and expertise in high profile cases that allows us to comment knowledgeably about pending cases and decisions. Being litigators with 20 plus years of experience, we have seen how prosecutors and legislators respond to a wide range of situations. When those issues come up again, we can draw on that experience and anticipate how they will handle them.
Q: How widely is the blog read?
A: We have subscribers and followers in 41 countries and we average 2000 hits per week.
Last November, we discussed the U.S. Supreme Court’s oral argument in United States v. Jones, which posed the question of whether police need to obtain a warrant before attaching a GPS device to a suspect’s vehicle during a criminal investigation.
We noted that in this case, 21st-century technology had come face to face with the constitutional requirements of the Fourth Amendment. We were hoping that the high court would uphold the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and hold that this action is a search that requires a warrant, but we took a pass on predicting what the Court would actually do.
On January 23, 2012, the Court decided the case – unanimously against the government and in favor of defendant Antoine Jones. The decision is fairly gratifying for those of us who believe it desirable to curb prosecutors’ power by imposing restrictions upon it, including, where appropriate, the requirement of a judge-issued warrant.
It turns out that both the advocates of the original-intent approach to constitutional interpretation, epitomized here and in general by Justice Antonin Scalia, and those who prefer the doctrine of the “living Constitution,” led here by Justice Samuel Alito, agree that the use of a GPS device by the government constitutes a search and requires a warrant.
Scalia, writing for a majority of the Justices, observed that prosecutors had intruded upon Jones’ property in way that would have been a “trespass” under common law.
Prosecutors “physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information,” Scalia wrote. “We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.” And for Scalia, that fact alone was enough to decide the case.
Alito, joined by three Justices who concurred in the result, used quite a different line of reasoning and sharply criticized Scalia’s majority opinion, saying that ironically, it relied upon 18th-century tort law to decide a case involving 21st-century technology.
“This holding, in my judgment, is unwise,” Alito wrote. “It strains the language of the Fourth Amendment; it has little if any support in current Fourth Amendment case law; and it is highly artificial.”
Instead, Alito wrote, he “would analyze the question presented in this case by asking whether [Jones’] reasonable expectations of privacy were violated by the long-term monitoring of the movements of the vehicle he drove.” Alito observed that for decades, the Court has invoked the concept of “reasonable expectations of privacy” in a number of cases to define the nature of a “search” under the Fourth Amendment and to expand the definition of “search” to actions that do not involve a trespass to someone’s property.
Even though Alito is often identified with the pro-prosecution, conservative wing of the Court, he took the defendant’s side in this case. As our blog post last November noted, at oral argument Alito expressed concern about how easy it is these days “to amass an enormous amount of information about people” by the use of today’s technology.
Alito’s opinion followed similar lines. In the absence of legislation about police use of GPS tracking, he wrote, “The best that we can do in this case is to apply existing Fourth Amendment doctrine and to ask whether the use of GPS tracking in a particular case involved a degree of intrusion that a reasonable person would not have anticipated.”
This is good news for constitutional rights and for defendants. Whatever approach one takes to the Fourth Amendment, it’s clear that prosecutors can’t attach a GPS to a suspect’s car without a warrant.
In November 2011, we at Ifrah Law expressed our views on a number of current issues in our blogs, Crime in the Suites and FTC Beat. This post summarizes and wraps up our thoughts from the month.
ACLU Wins FOIA Appeal on Prosecutors’ Use of Cell Phone Location Data
The Justice Department must turn over the names and docket numbers of numerous cases in which the government accessed cell phone location data without probable cause or a warrant.
Options for Suing the Federal Government Under Bivens Unlikely to Expand
U.S. Supreme Court argument indicates that the Justices are unlikely to extend Bivens to cover cases against private employees.
Judge Imposes 15-Year Sentence in FCPA Case; Appeal to Follow
This case will test the Justice Department’s expansive definition of “foreign official” under the statute.
High Court Hears Argument in GPS Fourth Amendment Case
The Justices grapple with issues of search and seizure in an online, wired world.
In Appeal of Construction Fraud Case, DOJ Seeks Tougher Sentences
This case, arising from Boston’s “Big Dig” project, will test the limits of a trial judge’s sentencing discretion.
Self-Regulation Reigns, for Now, on Consumer Data Privacy Issues
The online advertising industry is inching its way to more comprehensive policies regarding the collection of consumer data.
Google, Microsoft Assume Roles of Judge, Jury and Executioner on the Web
The Internet giants cancel the Web connections of companies that are accused by the government of mortgage fraud but have not been convicted.
New House Hearing Shows Strength of Hill Support for Legal Online Gaming
Many members of Congress remain serious that legal and technical obstacles can be overcome and that legislation can be passed in this area.
Convicted of Fraud but Changed Their Lives; Appeals Court Takes Note
A couple committed mortgage fraud back in the late ‘90s. The 7th Circuit gives them sentencing credit for self-rehabilitation.
More Big Pharma Companies Cough Up Big Dollars in DOJ Settlements
How high will these settlements go? The government has the power to strong-arm drug companies into settlements. How much will it demand?
Federal Criminal (Other), Federal Criminal Procedure, Federal Sentencing, Fraud, Internet Law, White-collar crime
In August 2010, a unanimous panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled that if police wish to attach a GPS device to a criminal suspect’s car without a warrant, they first need to go to a judge and obtain a warrant based on probable cause.
The act of attaching such a device to a vehicle, the court said, is a “search” that requires a warrant under the Fourth Amendment because this type of surveillance is so pervasive and invasive that no one would have a reasonable expectation that it would occur. At the time, we expressed agreement with the appeals court’s ruling, and we continue to hold that view.
On November 8, 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument on this important case, in which 21st-century technology came face to face with the constitutional requirements of the Fourth Amendment. The case is United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259, and grows out of the placing by D.C. police of a GPS tracker on the Jeep Cherokee belonging to Antoine Jones, then a nightclub owner in the District of Columbia. The surveillance led to the seizure of 97 kilograms of cocaine and $850,000 in cash, but the D.C. Circuit threw out the conviction.
The justices did not seem to tip their hand for either side in the argument, asking difficult questions both to the attorney from the U.S. solicitor general’s office who argued in favor of the surveillance and to the lawyer for the arguing in favor of Jones.
Justice Samuel Alito put the question very clearly early in the argument: “It seems to me the heart of the problem that’s presented by this case and will be presented by other cases involving new technology is that in the pre-computer, pre-Internet age much of the privacy . . . that people enjoyed was not the result of legal protections or constitutional protections; it was the result simply of the difficulty of traveling around and gathering up information.”
“But with computers,” Justice Alito continued, “it’s now so simple to amass an enormous amount of information about people that consists of things that could have been observed on the streets, information that was made available to the public. . . . So how do we deal with this? Do we just say, well, nothing is changed, so that all the information that people expose to the public – is fair game? There is no search or seizure when that is obtained, because there isn’t a reasonable expectation of privacy?”
Michael Dreeben of the SG’s office replied that this case actually does not involve a “particularly dramatic change,” and that if society wishes to deal with GPS surveillance directly, the remedy would be in the passage of legislation.
Later, in response to vigorous questioning by the Justices, Stephen Leckar, arguing for Jones, said, “I think the workable rule and the simplest rule that should be adopted is this. I think the Court should say to the law enforcement agency: You came here looking for a rule; we are going to give you a rule. If you want to use GPS devices, get a warrant, absent exigent circumstances or another recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment.”
Leckar’s view continues to make sense to us. It is very difficult, based on the argument, to predict what the high court will actually do.
Federal Criminal (Other)